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ABSTRACT
Networks (Autonomous Systems-AS) allocate or revoke IP
prefixes with the intervention of official Internet resource
number authorities, and select and advertise policy-compliant
paths towards these prefixes using the inter-domain routing
system and its primary enabler, the Border Gateway Proto-
col (BGP). Securing BGP has been a long-term objective of
several research and industrial efforts during the last decades,
that have culminated in the Resource Public Key Infrastruc-
ture (RPKI) for the cryptographic verification of prefix-to-
AS assignments. However, there is still no widely adopted
solution for securing IP prefixes and the (AS-)paths lead-
ing to them; approaches such as BGPsec have seen minus-
cule deployment. In this work, we design and implement
a Blockchain-based system that (i) can be used to validate
both of these resource types, (ii) can work passively and
does not require any changes in the inter-domain routing
system (BGP, RPKI), and (iii) can be combinedwith currently
available systems for the detection andmitigation of routing
attacks. We present early results and insights w.r.t. scalabil-
ity.
1 INTRODUCTION
Internet Routing. The Internet is composed of ∼64k [23]
interconnected networks (Autonomous Systems–AS) that par-
ticipate in the global Internet routing system. Official Inter-
net Registries (IRs), with different areas of jurisdiction, form
hierarchies (e.g., from IANA [24] to Regional IRs–RIRs [37]
to National IRs–NIRs [38]) that manage Internet number re-
sources such as AS Numbers (ASNs) and IP prefixes (i.e.,
groups of IP addresses). These authorities assign IP prefixes
to ASes, which can in turn lease/delegate these resources
to other ASes. ASes exchange prefix reachability informa-
tion via the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [44], advertis-
ing (i.e., originating) the prefixes that are allocated to them
and adopting routes to reach prefixes that are originated by
other ASes. BGP is a policy-based [15], destination-oriented
path-vector protocol, where an AS receives paths to a des-
tination prefix from its neighbors, selects the “best” path
to prefer based on its local routing policies and other cri-
teria [9], and advertises it to other neighbors based on its
export policies.
BGP (in-)security today. While BGP is scalable and ex-
pressive in terms of routing policies, the lack of security
by design (e.g., authentication of IP prefix advertisements)
is a critical limitation that frequently results in routing at-
tacks, such as BGP hijacks. These attacks, based on the ma-
nipulation of routing tables via fraudulent advertisements
of prefixes and/or AS-paths, have pestered the Internet for
decades [18, 19, 30, 31, 34, 36, 42]. To remedy this, several ap-
proaches have been proposed [33, 47]; the most prominent
ones are (i) RPKI [4], to secure prefix-to-origin mappings,
and (ii) BGPsec [27], to cryptographically protect each hop
of the AS-path to a prefix. However, securing inter-domain
routing is an extremely slow process [16]. While BGPsec is
still practically not deployed [17], there are serious efforts
on expanding RPKI adoption, spearheaded by large ISPs [3]
and IXPs [13]. Despite the rapid increase in RPKI Route Ori-
gin Authorizations (ROAs), and the adoption of Route Ori-
gin Validation (ROV) [40], the highly centralized nature of
RPKIw.r.t. PKI certificate authorities [11], and its inability to
protect networks against sophisticated hijacks (e.g.,AS-path
manipulation more than 1 hop away from the legal origin of
a prefix) require complementary approaches.
Blockchains and Applications. A Blockchain [35] is a se-
quence of cryptographically protected and linked units of
information, called blocks, and serves as a distributed, repli-
cated, append-only, tamper-resistant ledger. Anyone can eas-
ily retrace the history of the transactions that are stored in
the blocks; transactions are non-reputable. Numerous appli-
cations of this concept [49] have been implemented mainly
in the area of e-finance (e.g., Bitcoin cryptocurrencies [35],
Ethereum smart contracts [12]). Blockchain-based propos-
als have recently appeared in the context of managing and
securing Internet resources, such asASNs [50], IP prefixes [43,
50], BGP updates [20, 46] and DNS records [29]. While these
approaches employ Blockchain mechanisms to address the
lack of security in the Internet, they are based on constructs
that are complex to manage, scale up, and secure (e.g., smart
contracts [2]). This makes their application extremely chal-
lenging, hindering potential adoption [21].
Objectives. In this work, our intention is to build a passive
Blockchain-based system for storing and validating trans-
actions related to IP prefix allocations, revocations and up-
dates, as well as BGP path announcements and withdrawals.
Drawing from the numerous lessons that the bumpy road
towards adoption of RPKI and BGPsec has taught the net-
working community [10], we focus on simplicity of design
to enable the use of Blockchains as passive hijack detection
systems. Our approach should be compatible with previous
efforts that, e.g., form complementary chains for concurrent
path validation [46], or produce genesis blocks for IP-to-AS
assignments based on IANA-RIR-ISP-AS interactions [50].
Contributions. Our contributions in the context of Block-
chain systems for securing BGP [20, 43, 46, 50] are:
(1) Based on first principles [28], we design a simple, scal-
able and robust system that (i) works in parallel to ex-
isting inter-domain routing, (ii) can detect violations in
both IP allocation actions and path advertisements, and
(iii) can be incrementally deployed, surpassing the limi-
tations of classic proactive security approaches [4, 27].
(2) We provide an open-source implementation that can be
tested in the real world with minimal requirements. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first prototype that
implements the concepts of themotivational position pa-
per of Hari et al. [20]; however, we do not use Blockchains
to change BGP, but to validate its information.
Overview. Section 2 describes the formation of the overlay
Blockchain network, and the (inter-)actions of the partici-
pating nodes. Section 3 gives an overview of the basic en-
tities of the Blockchain, i.e., blocks and transactions, while
Sections 4 and 5 describe in detail the transactions specific to
the resources that we want to secure (i.e., IP prefixes and AS-
paths, respectively), including their respective state and val-
idation mechanisms. Section 6 presents preliminary results
using a minimal viable prototype, focusing on its scalability.
After discussing related work in Section 7, we conclude the
paper.
2 THE BLOCKCHAIN NETWORK
Here, we describe the basic operations that the networked
Blockchain instances (nodes-ASes) need to perform.
Nodes. In our Blockchain network, each node corresponds
to an AS and runs its own Blockchain instance. It possesses:
(i) an IP address and port, where the node is reachable, (ii)
the ASN of the network where the node is running, and (iii)
a pair of public and private keys for cryptographic oper-
ations. Nodes form an overlay peer-to-peer full-mesh net-
work, independently from BGP, and communicate over the
Internet.
Bootstrapping. An initial group of nodes, called bootstrap
nodes, start populating the chain, using the IP prefix alloca-
tion Genesis block as the first block of the chain (see Sec-
tion 3). These nodes serve as rendezvous points between
new arrivals and already connected nodes. Every new node
peerswith them and requests their neighbors; therefore, they
have a full view of the network at any given time. Example
bootstrap nodes could be well-connected ISPs or IXPs.
Peering andAuthenticating. To become peers, two nodes
need to exchange their public keys and associate them with
node identifiers (ASNs). To scale this up, after discovering
the rest of the network, new nodes broadcast their public
keys together with their digitally signed information (IP ad-
dress, port, ASN), and request the same data from their new
peers. Key-to-ASN associations can be optionally mediated
by IRs. Peers periodically check the liveness of each other
via “keep-alive” messages; non-responding peers are discon-
nected (from their neighbors’ perspective).
MakingTransactions.Nodes generate transactions accord-
ing to their activity w.r.t. inter-domain routing; e.g., they can
allocate IP prefixes or advertise paths to these prefixes. Ev-
ery new transaction is broadcasted to the network; every
node is notified about and can validate incoming transac-
tions, rejecting or logging invalid ones (e.g., for real-time
detection of routing attacks or offline forensics).
Mining Blocks. In our setup, any node can act as a miner;
nodes can collect incoming and self-generated transactions
and include them in blocks. Before starting the mining pro-
cess, the miner must ensure that it has the most up-to-date
–valid– version of the chain and that the transactions it is
about to mine are valid and do not already exist in the chain.
Different schemes (we select Proof of Work-PoW [35]; Proof
of Stake-PoS [26] is an alternative) can be used for “prov-
ing” the miner to the other nodes. After the mining is com-
plete, the miner sends a message to all its neighbors to let
them know that the chain has just been updated with one
new block; they can in turn request the new chain from the
miner.
ValidatingChains.Whenever a node receives an –updated–
chain learned from another node, it needs to validate the
chain’s consistency and correctness before proceeding to
the conflict resolution stage (e.g., in case the new chain is
different from its own). For each block, it (i) checks that the
hash of the previous block is consistent, (ii) verifies the Proof
of Work/Stake, and (iii) authenticates the miner of the block
using the miner’s public key and signature. Finally, the node
can check whether the mined transactions in the chain are
actually valid, using chain-derived states (see Sections 4, 5).
Resolving Conflicts. After validating a new chain, a node
needs to decide if it should adopt it as the most recent –
valid– version. This decision is made using a conflict-resolution
algorithm; we opt for the simple “longest chain” rule [35].
3 BLOCKS AND TRANSACTIONS
The Blockchain is the primary data structure that is repli-
cated among the nodes of the Blockchain overlay network
(see Section 2). It is a simply connected list of blocks, that
are mined by these nodes. Each block contains one or more
transactions associated with allocating IP prefixes to ASes
and advertising (partial) AS-paths towards these prefixes.
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For the basic Blockchain design, we build on the required
principles proposed in the original Bitcoin paper [35].
Basic Blocks. Each block includes the following data:
(1) transactions: a list of all the transactions in this block.
(2) hash: the hash of the block’s content (e.g., with a speci-
fied amount of leading zeros [35] determining PoW dif-
ficulty).
(3) nonce: the –tunable– value used for the generation of
the PoW of this block.
(4) previous hash: the hash of the previous block in the
chain, used to validate the consistency of the chain as
an uninterrupted sequence of linked blocks.
(5) signature: the digital signature of the block, signed by
its miner using its private key.
(6) index: the position of the block in the chain.
(7) timestamp: the time when the block was built.
(8) mined_timestamp: the time when the block was mined.
(9) miner: the ID (ASN) of the node that mined this block.
Genesis Blocks. The first block to be included in the chain
is called the Genesis Block; this does not need to be mined,
since the data in this block originate from reliable sources
and are used to “bootstrap” the chain. Since we aim to pro-
tect IP prefixes and the paths leading to them,Genesis Blocks
include initial mappings of IP prefixes to ASNs, before net-
works start advertising them to the rest of the Internet. These
data can stem from IRs [37] and can be pre-populated using
the currently available RPKI ROAs [45] as “ground truth”.
Transactions. Transactions are included in Blocks. Each
transaction maps input data to output data, and includes:
(1) input: a list of input parameters and values, including
what are the involved entities (sender, recipient), resources
and corresponding constraints/rules. Example: “ASX leases
prefix P to ASY for a period of two months.”
(2) output: a list of output parameters and values, repre-
senting the result of this transaction, e.g., “Prefix P is
now allocated to ASY for a period of two months”.
(3) type: the type of the transaction, i.e., : IP Allocation
- (Genesis) Assign/Update/Revoke (see Section 4),
BGP Path - Announce/Withdraw (see Section 5).
(4) signature: the digital signature of the transaction, signed
by the node that created it, using its private key.
(5) timestamp: the time the transaction was made.
(6) txid: the unique ID of the transaction.
Workflow. Before proceeding to the description of specific
transaction types, we need to understand what actions an
AS needs to be able to perform in the context of inter-domain
routing. We consider the following motivational workflow.
(1) An IR assigns a prefix P to ASX with a specific lease pe-
riod. We consider this a prefix “allocation” transaction
from an AS to one or more ASes. Since IANA and other
IRs can participate in such allocations, special ASNs can
be used as their identifiers (in input/output parameters).
(2) ASX allocates this prefix to organization Y, to be used by
the siblings ASW and ASZ of Y for a specific time period.
(3) ASW and ASZ advertise this prefix to their neighbors,
which in turn propagate this announcement to their own
neighbors. To encode this information, we do not need
to include the entire AS-path vector in a transaction; the
knowledge that “this AS learned this prefix from these
ASes and advertises it to those ASes” is sufficient to build
valid AS-level graphs leveraging transaction sequences.
(4) ASW and/or ASZ withdraw the prefix since their lease
period is about to expire or a network failure occurred.
(5) ASX revokes the prefix allocation, reclaiming ownership.
We classify transactions in IP Allocation (Section 4) and BGP
Path (Section 5) transactions. By going through the transac-
tions that are encoded –in sequence–within the Blockchain,
nodes/ASes recreate and update the corresponding states.
Using these states, they validate transactions by comparing
what they get with what they expect; if any transaction fails
one of the checks, it is invalid and it is dropped and logged.
4 IP ALLOCATION TRANSACTIONS
These transactions relate to the management and validation
of the mapping between IP prefixes and ASNs. The basic
principle is enabling ASes to allocate/assign IP prefixes to
other ASes, updating the period of this lease, or revoking it.
Advocating simplicity of design, our proposed Assign trans-
action type can serve equivalently to the IP register, IP allo-
cate, IP assign and ROA add transactions described in [50],
reducing the overhead of complex resource state machines.
Moreover, we consider transactions as simple input/output
processes, avoiding coin trading and management implica-
tions [43, 50].
Genesis Assign. This is the first transaction to be included
in the chain (in the Genesis Block). It starts either empty (for
typical bootstrapping) or retrieves IP allocation data from
trustworthy sources (including RPKI ROAs and IRs) and for-
mats them. The input is the data retrieved from these sources
(e.g., a ROA associating prefix P to ASX). The output is a list
of “ground truth” (Prefix, ASN) allocations.
Assign. This transaction is made when an AS (or IR) wants
to allocate/assign the prefix it currently owns to one ormore
ASes (or IRs) for a specified duration of time (i.e., lease). The
original owner of this prefix loses any claim over it until the
lease duration has expired. The input is a list of:
(1) prefix: the prefix to be allocated.
(2) as_source: the AS (original prefix owner) that allocates
the prefix and makes (and signs) the Assign transaction.
(3) as_dest: the AS(es) to which the prefix is allocated.
(4) source_lease: the original lease duration as it was set
for the prefix owner that makes this transaction.
(5) lease_duration: the lease duration (≤ source_lease).
(6) transfer_tag:flag determining sub-leasing capabilities.
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(7) last_assign: the txid of the transaction that allocated
the prefix to its original owner, i.e., as_source.
The output is a list of updated IP-to-AS ownership entries,
using one entry per destination (i.e., recipient) ASN: (prefix,
as_dest, lease_duration, transfer_tag).
Update. This transaction is made when an AS wants to up-
date the –not expired– lease period of a prefix it had previ-
ously assigned to another AS. The input is the following:
(1) as_source: the AS that updates the lease period and
makes (and signs) the Update transaction.
(2) assign_tran: txid of the original Assign transaction.
(3) new_lease:new lease (≤ source_lease(assign_tran))
The output is a list of updated IP-to-AS ownership entries,
using one entry per destination ASN of the initial assign_tran:
(prefix, as_dest, new_lease, transfer_tag).
Revoke. This transaction is made when an AS wants to re-
claim the prefix from all the ASes it had previously assigned
it to, and is only valid once the designated lease duration
has actually expired. Revocations can be generated automat-
ically. The input is a list of the following elements:
(1) as_source: the AS that reclaims the prefix and makes
(and signs) the Revoke transaction.
(2) assign_tran: txid of the revoked Assign transaction.
The output is: (prefix, as_source, transfer_tag,
new_lease_duration), where the first three elements are
extracted directly from the originalAssign transaction, while
the new lease is calculated as: source_lease(assign_tran)
- lease_duration(assign_tran).
State. The IP Allocation state is collected at each node and
holds information about the ownership of each IP prefix;
which AS currently owns it, for how long, if it can transfer it
to other ASes and the ID of the last related validAssign trans-
action. Initially, this state is populated using IP allocation
data gathered from reliable sources, contained in the Gene-
sis block and encoded in a Genesis Assign transaction. It gets
updated whenever a new IP Allocation transaction makes it
into the chain. For Assign transactions, nodes replace the
current owner of a prefix with the ASes the owner is assign-
ing the prefix to. For Revoke transactions, nodes restore the
original prefix owner. For Update transactions, they simply
update the lease periods of the respective allocation entries.
Validating Assign transactions. First, the node needs to
check whether as_source is able to assign this prefix to
as_dest; this is feasible only if (i) as_sourcecurrently owns
the prefix, (ii) it can provide the txid of the last valid assign-
ment that transferred the prefix to it (last_assign), (ii) its
source_lease is greater than (or equal to) the new
lease_duration, and (iii) it has the right to transfer the pre-
fix to others (transfer_tag). It also checks if as_dest are
in the blockchain network and thus, verifiable.
Validating Update transactions. The node first checks
whether the lease of the current prefix owner(s) has not al-
ready expired. It then checks if the AS that makes this trans-
action (as_source) is the one that made the original Assign
transaction (assign_tran). Finally, it checks if the as_dest
in assign_tran, currently own(s) the prefix.
Validating Revoke transactions. The node ensures that
the lease has expired for revocation to be feasible. If it has
expired, it executes the same checks as for the Update trans-
action (as_source, assign_tran and as_dest checks).
5 BGP PATH TRANSACTIONS
These transactions relate to the management and validation
of end-to-end AS-level paths towards IP prefixes, originated
by ASes compliant to valid IP Allocations (Section 4). The
basic principle is enabling ASes to advertise prefixes they
learn from one or more ASes, to other ASes, as well as with-
draw them. Valid paths towards prefixes can be then built by
examining these “learn-advertise” operations in sequence.
Note that by taking advantage of sequences of Announce
transactions of the form “ASX learned prefix P from ASY
and advertised it to ASW, ASZ”, instead of “ASX has an AS-
path AP towards prefix P”, we minimize the complexity of
maintaining highly dynamic information for end-to-end AS-
paths (e.g., as encoded in BGP updates during a BGP path ex-
ploration process, or in complex structures ofAS sub-groups
as proposed in [46]). Since we encode stable connectivity
and policy information from the perspective of the AS that
conducts the transaction, we save resources (see Section 6).
Announce. This transaction is made when an AS wants to
advertise a prefix it learned from some –neighbor– ASes
to some other –neighbor– ASes. Routing policies, such as
valley-free policies [15], can be encoded both in the set of
neighbors from which the prefix is learned (import policy)
and the set of neighbors to which it is advertised (local and
export policy). For privacy purposes, an AS can select itself
what information it wants to publish in the Blockchain. The
input of this transaction is a list of the following elements:
(1) prefix: the prefix to be announced/advertised.
(2) as_source: the AS that advertises the prefix and makes
(and signs) the Announce transaction.
(3) as_source_list: ASNs of neighbor ASes from which
the prefix was learned.
(4) as_dest_list:ASNs of neighbor ASes to which the pre-
fix was advertised.
Theoutput is a list of partial paths towards the prefix, formed
between the ASes of as_source_list, as_source, and
as_dest_list. For example, if prefix = P , as_source =
ASX, as_source_list = [AS1, AS2], and as_dest_list =
[AS3, AS4], the output encodes the path set {(P-AS1-ASX-
AS3), (P-AS1-ASX-AS4), (P-AS2-ASX-AS3), (P-AS2-ASX-AS4)}.
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Withdraw. This transaction is made when an AS wants to
withdraw a specific prefix from all theASes it had previously
advertised it to, e.g., due to a network failure or for policy-
related reasons. The input is the following:
(1) prefix: the prefix to be withdrawn.
(2) as_source: the AS that withdraws the prefix and makes
(and signs) the Withdraw transaction.
The output encodes the same information as the input.
State. The BGP Path state is encoded in directed AS-level
graphs per prefix. Similar to the IP Allocation state, it is ini-
tially populated using the data of the Genesis Block. First, a
graph is created for every prefix; the first node of each graph
is the prefix itself. After that, an edge between an AS node
and the prefix node is added for every AS that owns the pre-
fix based on the IP allocation data. After a new –valid– As-
sign transaction is inserted in the chain, the previous topol-
ogy for this prefix is cleared, since the prefix owner(s) (and
thus, the valid origin(s)) change; new edges between the
ASes that are the new owners of the prefix, and the prefix
node, are added. For Revoke transactions, this process is re-
versed. Update transactions do not affect this state. After a
new Announce transaction is added to the chain, new edges,
from as_source to as_dest_list, are added to the prefix
graph. These edges are directed towards the prefix, follow-
ing the traffic direction. Finally, Withdraw transactions re-
sult in the removal of the edges between the withdrawing
node and its predecessors. All other nodes (and their cor-
responding edges) that cannot reach the prefix in the new
regime are also removed. For simplicity, we assume thatwith-
drawals precede revocations, meaning that the graph is al-
ready clear of stale routing information upon a Revoke trans-
action.
Validating Announce transactions. First, the node veri-
fies the origin of this transaction (as_source) based on the
topology (AS-level graph) associated to this prefix; if as_source
does not have valid paths to the prefix via its as_source_list
neighbors (fromwhich it learned the prefix), the transaction
is rejected. It then checks if all the ASes in as_source_list
and as_dest_list are in the Blockchain network. Finally,
it checks if this transaction introduces loops in the topology
of this prefix; if it does, it is rejected.
ValidatingWithdraw transactions. Similarly toAnnounce
transaction checks, the node checks if there is at least one
valid path from the withdrawing AS towards the prefix.
6 PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
Basics.We have implemented an open-source [48] working
prototype of the proposed Blockchain in Python. Each run-
ning node instance has an IP address, port and ASN associ-
ated to it. Public keys are self-signed. Nodes peer with each
other, form an overlay network, and execute the actions de-
scribed in Section 2 (e.g., discovering neighbors, exchanging
keys, making transactions, mining blocks, etc.) using a REST
interface. For example, they issue GET requests to acquire
the version of the chain from other peers, or POST requests
to broadcast transactions they make to the network.
Correctness. To verify the correctness of our implementa-
tion, we test hypothetical chains with real BGP data. Gen-
esis Assign transactions are bootstrapped using the pfx2as
dataset (IP prefix to ASN mappings) from CAIDA [7], based
on the entries of the Routing Information Bases (RIBs) of
RouteViews [41] BGPmonitors. To form new BGP Path - An-
nounce transactions, we replay BGP updates, collected via
BGPStream [5], as seen on RouteViews and RIPE RIS [39]
monitors, and translate them by extracting AS-triplets (i.e.,
[previous_AS, advertising_AS, next_AS])]) from theAS-path
included in the BGP update message. We verify that the AS-
level graph for a prefix, as created via the raw BGP update
data, is equal to the graph derived from processing the trans-
actions of the chained blocks.We also check that valid trans-
actions of any type have the desired effect on the Blockchain
and its associated IP Allocation and BGP Path states. More-
over, we generate and broadcast invalid transactions, such
as transactions with a fake creator, Assign/Update/Revoke
transactions from invalid origins, orAnnounce/Withdraw trans-
actions from nodes that do not have valid paths to the pre-
fix(es) theywant to announce/withdraw.We verify that such
transactions are logged and discarded (even if they make it
to the chain of a malicious or misconfigured node). Note
that transactions involving ASes off the network are not
verifiable and are not added to the chain; however, as the
Blockchain network scales up, more prefixes and AS-paths
(on per-prefixAS-level graphs) can be successfully validated.
State Storage Requirements. Next, we use back of the
envelope calculations to estimate the storage capacity (in
terms of RAM or HDD space) that the proposed Blockchain
would require, per instance, in order to store the needed IP
Allocation and BGP Path transactions and state. We focus
on the storage “heavy hitters”. The calculations are based
on (i) the BGP report by Huston [22], and (ii) AS-level topo-
logical statistics by CAIDA [6]. We apply the notation of
order of magnitude for the calculations, defined as: M(x) =
⌊loд10x⌋, x ∈ R. For example, the number 80 = 8 ∗ 10 cor-
responds to an order of magnitude M(80) = M(10) = 1. In
our Python-specific implementation [48], we calculate the
memory requirements both for IPv4 and IPv6-related trans-
actions, for all types, as M(10) bytes per transaction. W.r.t.
IP Allocation state, we store informationworth ofM(10) bytes
per prefix. According to [22],M(100k) IPv4 andM(10k) IPv6
prefixes are currently advertised in BGP by M(10k) ASes;
M(1) bytes are required for storing a single IPv4 prefix,M(10)
bytes for IPv6 and M(1) bytes for an ASN. Therefore, we
needM(100k ∗ 1 ∗ 10k ∗ 10 + 10k ∗ 10 ∗ 10k ∗ 10) = M(1010)
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Table 1: Mining times for different PoW implementations.
# lead 0’s min(s) max(s) avg(s) med(s) 90th perc.(s)
4 0.0 1.4 0.2 0.9 1.5
5 0.1 12.8 3.1 3.6 8
6 0.3 223.8 54.7 31.6 160
bytes, or M(10) GBytes for maintaining the entire IP Allo-
cation state. This estimation is compliant (M(10)GBytes for
∼ 800K prefixes) with the empirically measured Blockchain
size (∼ 1 GByte for ∼ 150k IP prefixes) found in [43]; while
we follow a different approach and architecture focusing
on simplicity of design, our calculations correctly approx-
imate the order of magnitude needed to store this kind of
state. Following a similar logic for the per-prefix AS-level
graphs (BGP Path state), and taking into account that be-
sides the M(100k) IPv4 prefixes, M(10k) IPv6 prefixes and
M(10k) ASNs we see M(100k) AS-level links in BGP, we
needM(100k ∗ 1 ∗ 100k ∗ 1 + 10k ∗ 10 ∗ 100k ∗ 1) = M(1010)
or M(10) GBytes to store all AS-level prefix graphs.
To understand how fast the previous state increases, we
consider the BGP Path transactions, since the related infor-
mation changes orders of magnitude faster than IP prefix
ownership (which relies on slow management processes in-
stead of dynamic topology and policy changes). According
to [22], BGP sees M(100k) BGP updates per day. Each AS
involved in an update (announcement/withdrawal) learned
by one of its neighbors, propagates this update to its other
neighbors. In the Blockchain, these updates sent to each
neighbor are grouped in transactions containing several AS-
triplets (e.g., “ASX learned prefix P from ASA, ASB and ad-
vertised it to ASC, ASD”). An AS-path of length L is broken
into L AS-triplets and thus L such transactions; the average
AS-path length in the Internet is M(1) [22]. Thus, the trans-
action (vs BGP update) counts are scaled down by a factor
approximated by the neighbor degree of each AS (equal to
M(10), on average [6]), and scaled up by the average path
length; the Blockchain should seeM(1 ∗ 100k/10) = M(10k)
transactions per day related to BGP updates. RequiringM(10)
bytes per transaction, this translates toM(10∗10k) = M(100k)
bytes in total per day. Our calculations are conservative, not
accounting for savings in duplicate transaction counts vs
BGP update bursts during the BGP path exploration process.
Mining speed. We use a server with average features (4
CPU cores, 16GB RAM) as a miner for BGP Path - Announce
transactions. By replaying raw BGP updates as Announce
transactions, we evaluate the time elapsed between the cre-
ation (and broadcasting) of a transaction, and the success-
ful mining of the block that contains it. This time is indica-
tive of the “speed” of the mining process, and thus whether
the chain formation can keep up with online management
of transactions. This is critical for Internet Blockchains to
avoid the buffering of enormous backlogs (e.g.,BGP updates)
during periods of bursty control-plane traffic. Our results for
different difficulties of PoW are presented in Table 1. Note
that an increase in 1 leading zero leads to approximately
a 10x increase in computation time. This demonstrates a
trade-off between the load of incoming transactions to be
mined and the robustness of the Blockchain. Larger loads
require more transactions within a block, and faster min-
ing times to avoid ever-increasing backlogs.However, speed
comes at the price of robustness, since it may be easier for
attackers to gather the necessary PoW power to corrupt the
chain. Detection-wise, the Blockchain system can operate
in real-time, since incoming transactions are validated the
moment they are created and broadcasted to the network.
7 RELATEDWORK
Addressing the root cause of routing attacks, i.e., the assump-
tion of trust amongASeswithout proper authenticationmech-
anisms [32], is a relatively old –but still unmet– objective;
for example, Chang et al. [8] propose a behavioral assump-
tion scheme that probabilistically computes AS reputation
based on previous feedback and expectations. With the ad-
vent of Blockchains as systems that can facilitate transac-
tions among mutually distrustful entities, without the need
for trusted mediators, several related efforts have been done
to secure Internet resources. Our work is influenced by the
position paper of Hari et al. [20], who first introduced the
concept of applying Blockchains in the context of IP pre-
fixes and BGP updates; however, they focusmore on the con-
cepts rather than actual design and implementation. Xing et
al. [50] propose BGPcoin; a Blockchain-based Internet num-
ber resource management system that leverages Ethereum
smart contracts to protect IP prefixes and authenticate valid
prefix origins, without though securing the end-to-end AS-
path. Pailisse et al. [43] follow a similar approach, based on
PoS mining, to also validate IP prefix allocation/delegation,
emphasizing in performance and scalability assessment. Based
on a similar motivation as our work, Saad et al. [46] propose
RouteChain, a system that employs Blockchains to validate
BGP path advertisements. However, RouteChain requires the
dynamic formation of AS hierarchies and subgroups for quick
consensus; this has been proven to be extremely challenging
in practice [14]. Finally, there have been attempts to provide
Blockchain-based Internet naming validation and/or secure
DNS, such asNamecoin [25],Blockstack [1], andDecDNS [29].
8 CONCLUSIONS
Following a first-principles approach for encoding inter-domain
routing primitives, we designed and implemented an open-
source prototype of a Blockchain that stores and validates
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transactions related to IP prefixes (assignments and revo-
cations) and BGP paths towards these prefixes (announce-
ments and withdrawals). We conducted a preliminary eval-
uation of the prototype and we showed that it can be hosted
on servers with average technical capabilities (e.g., storage
capacity), being able to copewith the estimated load of trans-
actions in today’s Internet.Moreover, it canwork –passively–
in concert with RPKI and other detection systems (based
on Blockchain or not), e.g., receiving ground truth prefix-to-
AS data from RPKI ROAs or feeding hijack detectors with
logged invalid BGP Path transactions.
Future research directions include: (i) prototype deploy-
ment in at least two –neighboring–ASes (e.g., IXP peers), (ii)
investigation of PoW vs PoS, (iii) extensions of transaction
data (e.g., BGP communities), (iv) mitigation of impact of
flapping routes on BGP Path transactions, and (v) neighbor-
selective BGP Path - Withdrawals and IP Allocations.
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